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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Amy and Navy-Selective Service-When Is Induction Complete?
Habeas Corpus. Petitioner contended that he was unlawfully deprived of his liberty and held for army service. He stated that he was a
conscientious objector and urged that claim before his local draft board.

Being overruled, he appealed to the state board; and again being denied,
he presented himself at the induction center to which he had been directed. There he was given a physical examination and notified of his
acceptance for service in the army and was commanded to stand and
take the oath of induction. He refused, and was ordered to the guard
house, and this proceeding followed.
After an interesting discussion of the petitioner's social philosophy
and background, the court agreed with the draft board that he was not
a conscientious objector but a combination of Socrates' and Mohandas
- Like Socrates, he "thought the law was unjust, but . . . didn't feel the call to
evade it."

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
2

[Vol. 21

Gandhi, and "an over-educated, egotistical, scholastic slacker." He
contended that he was not finally inducted and subject to military authority till he took the oath of induction. However, it was held that he
became a soldier subject to military jurisdiction when he was accepted
for service by the government, irrespective of his personal desires or
3
mental attitude. Habeas corpus denied.
At another point in the opinion, the court stated that notice of acceptance operated as induction. Thus it is not clear whether actual
notice is necessary, but, from its discussion taken as a whole, it would
seem that this court would not require notice. With this, the officials of
the Army and the Selective Service appear to be in full accord. Maj.
Charles R. Jonas, North Carolina State Director of Selective Service,
has said that after the Selective Service delivers the draftee to the induction station "The question of induction ... is one for the army to determine .... Billings [petitioner] probably could have been returned to
his local board by the recruiting and induction officer, and he could have
been prosecuted [by the civil authorities] for refusal to submit himself
for induction [which is just what the petitioner contended for]. The
recruiting and induction officer decided to proceed otherwise, and apparently his procedure has met with the approval of the court."4
If this be the law, it is different from the law under the Selective
Draft Act of 19175 which required notice of physical qualification for
service."* One case under that act, however, tends to substantiate the
principal case in holding that no oath was necessary to induction ;7 but
this was based on an express statutory provision that all enlistees and
draftees were subject to military law from the date that their notices of
call required them to report,8 and the notices themselves contained such
a statement. This applied whether or not the notice was ever actually
received. 9 If the address to which the notice was mailed was correct, 10
then the mailing constituted complete notice."'
2Like Gandhi, he said if the Germans and Japanese occupied our country, he
would not resist, but he would not cooperate with the invaders.
Ex parte Billings, 46 F. Supp. 663 (D.C. Kan. 1942).
'Letter to the author (January 15, 1943).
'40 STAT. 76 (1917), as amended, 40 STAT. 534 (1918), 40 STAT. 885 (1918),
40 STAT. 995 (1918), 50 U. S. C. A. p. 165 (1927).
O.Ver Mehren v. Sirmyer, 36 F. (2d) 876 (C. C. A. 8th, 1929). It is important
to note the difference between the induction.process under the act of 1940 and the
act of 1917. Under the present act the draftee is inducted at the hands of the army
after he presents himself at the induction center. Under the 1917 act, induction
was completed at the hands of the local board before the draftee reported for
active duty. After induction the inductee was mailed his notice ordering him to
report on a certain date and informing him that -he would be subject to military
jurisdiction as of that date. However, his induction could not be complete without
notice of physical qualification.
Franke v. Murray, 248 Fed. 865, L. R. A. 1918E 1015 (C. C. A. 8th, 1918).
'Second Article of War, 41 STAT. 787 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. §1473 (1927).
'United
States
v. McIntyre,
4 F.
(C. C.1920).
A. 9th, 1925).
10
Ex parte
Goldstein,
268 Fed.
431(2d)
(D. 823
C. Mass.
United States v. McIntyre, 4 F. (2d) 823 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925).
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Neither the Selective Training and Service Act of 194012 nor the
Service Extension Act of 194113 sets out the procedure for induction.
Authority to prescribe the rules and regulations necessary to carry out
the provisions of the act is delegated to the President. The regulations
now in effect and in effect at the time the petitioner presented himself
at the induction center merely provide, "At the induction center, the
selected men found acceptable will be inducted into the land or naval
forces."'14 There is no requirement for the giving of an oath.
There was, however, an earlier regulation, 15 to which the above is an
amendment, that did provide that "An officer... will administer a prescribed oath to each of the men. He will then inform them that they
are members of the land and [or] naval forces.... ." This regulation was
promulgated October 22, 1940. The amendment above was made December 31, 1941. Between these dates and under the authority of the
first order, it was held that induction did include swearing allegiance,' 8
but the petitioner's cause was heard more than nine months after the
amendment was made.
This amendment, eliminating the requirement of an oath, said the
court in the principal case, "undoubtedly was... to avoid question being
raised and to avoid waste of army time and effort in resisting such
1
However, there is a
improvident proceedings as the one here. "l*
dictum to the effect that the court would be of the same opinion even if
the earlier regulation were still in effect. The giving of an oath, it was
said, is a mere formality. It is only required by statute to be given to
8
voluntary enlistees.'
After the induction process was completed in the last war, the inductee became subject to the- jurisdiction of the court martial even
though his application for exemption had been improperly denied and
his induction was therefore unlawful.19 The present act provides that:
"No person shall be tried by any... court martial... unless such person
has been actually inducted ....
20 Here lawful induction is no more a
prerequisite to military jurisdiction than under the earlier act. Thus,
there is no reason to suspect that the holding on this point will now be
any different. Though he is not subject to military law till inducted, the
registrant, and also non-registrant, is considered to have complete
254 STAT. 885 (1940), 50 U. S. C. A. Appendix, §301 et seq. (Supp. 1942).
Id. §351 et seq.
,SELEcTivE SERvICE REGULATIONS (2d Ed. 1941) 1633.9.
"4 SELEcTI SERVICE REGULATiONS §429 (1940).
"Stone v. Christensen, 36 F. Supp. 739 (D. C. Ore. 1940).
"

S7,The writer does not necessarily agree with the court's criticism of the peti-

tioner and feels that such criticism could well be omitted from the opinion.

"Article of War 109, 41 STAT. 809 (1920), 10 U. S. C. A. §1581 (1927).
"Ex parte Tinkoff, 254 Fed. 912 (D. C. Mass. 1919).

.20Selective Training and Service Act §11 (1940), 54 STAT. 849 (1940), 50
U. S. C. A. Appendix, §311 (Supp. 1942).
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knowledge of the act and of the regulations made pursuant to it,21 and
the mailing to the registrant of any communication concerned with the
act constitutes notice of the contents whether or not it is ever actually
received. 22 Ignorance of the law, no matter for what reason, is no
excuse. 28
After the draft board mails the registrant his notice of classification,
he has five days to request an opportunity to appear before the board in
person. 2 4 If he does not speak English, he may appear with an interpreter, but he cannot be represented by an attorney. 25 The purpose of this
is probably to avoid prejudice to those unable to pay attorney's fees.
From the decision of the local board, the registrant may appeal to the
State Board of Appeal. 26 At that hearing the registrant has no right to
appear. The decision is based wholly on the record sent up from the
local board. Finally, the appeal may lie to- the President in certain
27
specified cases.
On receipt of new evidence the local board may reclassify the registrant at any time before induction, 28 and the same appellate procedure
lies from a reclassification as lies from the original classification. 29
In order to minimize any hardships and injustices caused by this procedure, Government Appeal Agents3 o and Advisory Boards have been
established.3 1 There is an Appeal Agent for each local board. His duties
are twofold: (1) to give registrants legal advice concerning appeal and
(2) to protect the interests of the government by appealing any classification he thinks should be appealed. Advisory Boards, appointed by the
governor of each state, have the sole function of aiding the registrant in
preparing his questionnaires, claims, etc. However, the functions of
these agencies are unfortunately inadequate because of the general lack
of knowledge of their existence.
Even though this procedure permits a fair hearing and the decision
of the local board is expressly made final except where appeal is authorized by the regulations, 3 2 the courts will grant review after exhaustion
of the remedies provided in the act38 in those cases where the board
211 SE&ECTIVE SERVICE REGULATIONS §155
22
1d. §158.
2' Lekto v. Scott, 251 Fed. 767 (E. D. N.

knowledge of English).
' 3 SELECTIVE SERVICE
" Id. §368.
2"Id. §§370-378.

REGuLATIONS

(1940).
Y. 1918) (petitioner had inadequate

§368 (1940).
7

2

Id.§§379-381.

28 Id. §387.
1 SE ,EcVSERvIcE REGULATIONS §135 "Id.
Io
(1940).§388.
1
1d. §145.
"Selective Training and Service Act §10 (1940), 54
C. A. Appendix, §310F (Supp. 1942).

STAT.

893 (1940), 50 U. S.

"Johnson v. United States, 126 F. (2d) 242 (C. C. A. 8th, 1942); United
States v. Kowal, 45 F. Supp. 301 (D. C. Del. 1942). Same applied under 1917 act.
Napore v. Rowe, 256 Fed. 832 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919). It was further held under
that act that after exhaustion of the remedies, resort to the courts must be prompt.
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acted arbitrarily, where it had no jurisdiction8 5 or where there was no
evidence to support the finding of the board. e * Also, where a defendant
is charged with violation of the Selective Service Act by failing to comply with the orders of the local board, he may defend on the same
grounds.3 7 However, in the last war, it was difficult-to prove any of
the prerequisites to judicial protection,38 and there is no reasoti to believe
that it will be easier now. 9
Review by certiorari is not permitted because the functions of the
draft boards are legislative and administrative and not judicial.40 Injunction will not lie 4 ' because the petitioner is claiming a violation of
merely personal rights and because equity will not interfere to control the
action of public officials constituting inferior quasi judicial tribunals on
matters within their jurisdiction. Therefore, it appears that the only
course open to the aggrieved registrant is to wait until he is inducted
and then sue out a writ of habeas corpus and attempt to convince the
court that the board denied him a fair hearing.
The constitutionality of legislation calling for compulsory military
service in time of war has many times been questioned and always sustained,42 but the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940 is the first
peace time compulsory service bill in the history of our nation. This fact
has furnished new fuel for attacks on the ground of unconstitutionality.
It is not doubted that Congress has the power to raise and support armies
Two months was too long to delay. Ex parte Blazekovic, 248 Fed. 327 (E. D.

Mich. 1918).
" United States v. Grieme, 128 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 3d, 1942); ex parte
Hurtflis, 245 Fed. 413 (E. D. N. Y. 1918).
" United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 (E. D. Ill. 1942) ; United States
ex rel. Bartalini v. Mitchell, 248 Fed. 997 (E. D. N. Y. 1918).
"*
Application of Greenberg, 39 F. Supp. 13 (D. C. N. J. 1941) ; ex parte Platt,
253 Fed. 798 (W. D. N. Y. 1917). If there is any evidence at all to support the
board, the court is without jurisdiction to review. United States v. Buttecali, 46 F.
Supp. 39 (S.D. Tex. 1942).
It has been said that the court has no jurisdiction at all to review the action of
the local board because it is purely administrative and not quasi judicial. Petition
of Soberman, 37 F. Supp. 522 (E. D. N. Y. 1941). However, that case appears
to have been based erroneously on an earlier decision that a writ of certiorari
would not issue to review the classification of the board. United States ex rel.
Roman v. Rauch, 253 Fed. 814, 816- (S. D. N. Y. 1918). The better view seems to
be that the court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the draft board,
but it may determine whether a fair hearing has been afforded. Micheli v. Paulin,
45 F. Supp. 687 (D. C. N. 3. 1942).
'T

United States v. Newman, 44 F. Supp. 817 CE. D. Ill. 1942).

"Ex Parte Kusweski, 251 Fed. 997 (N. D. N. Y. 1918).
"Filmio v. Powell, 38 F. Supp. 183 (D. N.'J. 1941).

'"Drumheller v. Berks County Local Board No. 1, 130 F. (2d) 610 (C. C. A. 3d,
1942). It was suggested under the 1917 act that certiorari would be appropriate.
Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54, 68 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917). However, the courts
refused to permit it. Re Kitzerow, 252 Fed. 865 (E. D. Wis. 1918).
. Angelus v. Sullivan, 246 Fed. 54, 64-66 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917) ; Totus v. United
States, 39 F. Supp. 7 (E. D. Wash. 1941).

"' Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. ed. 349, L. R. A.
1918C 361, ANt. CAs. 1918B 856 (1917).
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but it has been argued that the power to compel service

can only follow a declaration of war. Fortunately, this argument has
not been successful. 44 The power given to Congress is plenary. There
is no such limitation placed upon it. To so limit would preclude our
preparing for battle, though we knew battle was to come, until it was
too late. This thought is not new to our times. Alexander Hamilton
writing in The Federalist4 5 remarked that "the ceremony of a formal
declaration of war has of late fallen into disuse." He then pointed out
the mistake of waiting for an attack before issuing the legal warrant for
protective measures.
It is only by the grace of the legislature that certain classes of citizens

including conscientious objectors are exempt from service. Under the
present act objectors receive more liberal treatment than under the 1917
Act in that they are not required to be members of a religious sect.
However, their objections must be based on their "religious training and
belief."' 46 Thus, it still appears that no one without a religious belief
may be exempt even though he may have the strongest moral convictions
against combat. But, if one is entitled to an exemption, he does not have
to prove it affirmatively before his local board as he did under the 1917
Act. 47 In fact, the present administrative tendency is to permit few
48
exemptions to be waived, and those may only be waived in writing.
The requirement of military service, the "supreme and noble duty of
citizenship, '' 49 could, should Congress so desire, be exacted of every
citizen without exception. In upholding the constitutionality of the Confederate Conscription Law, the Virginia court said: "The citizens have
a right collectively and individually to the services of each other to avert
any danger which may be menaced. The manner in which the service is
to be apportioned among them and rendered by them, is a matter for
the legislature. The government, as the agent and trustee of the people,
is charged with the whole military strength of the nation, in order that
it may be employed so as to ensure the safety of all."5 0
EDwiN N. MANER, JR.
"U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, 12.
"United States v. Lambert, 123 F. (2d) 395 (C. C. A. 3d, 1941); United

States v. Herling, 120 F. (2d) 236 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
dr No XXV (1787).
" Selective Service and Training Act §4(g) (1940), 54 STAT. 885 (1940), 50
U. S. C. A. Appendix, §301 et seq. (Supp. 1942).
Napore v. Rowe, 256 Fed. 333 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919).
"Geraghty, Judicial Protection of Individuals Under the Selective Training
and Service Act of 1940 (1941) 36 ILL. L. REv. 310, 314, n. 34.
" Selective Draft Cases, 245 U. S. 366, 38 S. Ct. 159, 62 L. ed. 349, L. R. A.
1918C 361, ANN. CAs. 1918B 856 (1917).
" Burroughs v. Peyton, 16 Gratt. 470, 487 (Va. 1864).
Another of our Southern courts waked poetic in holding that a soldier forced
to serve was not a slave. It said, "Nations do not pension slaves to commemorate
their valor. They do not 'give in charge their names to a sweet lyre'; nor does
'sculpture in her turn give bond in stone and ever during brass to guard and immortalize the trust.'" Story v. Perkins, 243 Fed. 997, 998-999 (S. D. Ga. 1917).

